agencies. The survey of previous scholarship lacks breadth and depth; an unkind critic might describe the article as a species of armchair legal scholarship that pitches its critique at so lofty an altitude that the authors have difficulty seeing the .objects of their criticisms clearly. 6 Nevertheless, the article contains a number of interesting observations and shrewd criticism, and is useful as a reminder of an important issue that, although it has not been overlooked, does deserve additional at tention.
A more nuanced (to borrow one of the authors' favorite words) treatment of the subject would have produced a rather different article, of which the f o llowing might be the abstract:
The institutional dimension of legal interpretation -the fact that sensi ble principles of interpretation depend on the characteristics, in particu lar the capacities, of the various institutions that compose the legal sys tem, including legislatures, agencies, and courts -has long been recognized. But it has not, in our opinion, been sufficiently emphasized or subjected to adequate empirical inquiry. Some scholars of interpreta tion, such as Dworkin and Lessig, ignore the institutional dimension en tirely, though without necessarily denying its significance. Others, such as Easterbrook and Scalia and the "post-Thayerians" (such as Parker and Tushnet), premise their views of interpretation largely on institutional considerations, but do not discuss them at any length. Others, who do, such as Bickel, Hart and Sacks, Hayek, and Calabresi, have in our opin ion erroneous conceptions of the relative capacities of judges and legisla tors. Even those who, like Breyer, Ely, Eskridge, and Posner, engage in detailed and realistic analysis of the institutional factors in interpretation, which they clearly regard as central, have not attempted the type of em pirical analysis necessary to resolve the age-old debates over formalism, judicial activism, and the appropriate scope of administrative discretion.
There is a rigorous empirical literature on legal institutions, but most of it is not focused on their significance for interpretation. We propose em pirical studies of that significance, though we are mindful of the serious problems of feasibility that would beset such studies and are not inclined to conduct such studies ourselves. We acknowledge that our own analysis implies agnosticism regarding the interpretive questions that we discuss, such as the proper scope of judicial review of legislative and administra tive action and whether constitutional rights should even be justiciable.
This agnosticism has compelled us to abandon confident assertions about these matters that.each of us made in his earlier scholarly writings.
II.
A court has, roughly speaking, a choice between two conceptions of its role. One is narrow, formalistic; the model is that. of deducing legal outcomes from a major premise consisting of a rule of law laid down by a legislature and a minor premise consisting of the facts of the particular case. The other conception is broader, free-wheeling, pragmatic; judicial discretion is acknowledged and an outcome that is reasonable in light of its consequences sought. A court that takes the first route will be inclined to narrow, "literal," "strict," "originalist," or "textualist"7 interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, interpretation that sticks closely to the surface meaning of the text as its authors would have understood that meaning, as that is the kind of interpretation that minimizes (or at least pretends to minimize) judi cial discretion. A court that takes the second route will be inclined to loose construction, recognizing and trying to adjust for the limitations of foresight of legislators and the framers of constitutional provisions, limitations that can make literal interpretation a trap; trying in short to reach reasonable results consistent with the broad purposes of the provision in question. The choice between these styles of adjudication and hence interpretation is relative to circumstances, and the circum stances are strongly influenced by institutional considerations. These include the structure and personnel of the judiciary and of the legal profession more broadly; the structure, personnel, and operating methods of the legislature; the relative competence of the different branches of government with respect to specific classes of issue;8 the power relations among the branches; and the political, economic, and social institutions of the society.
These issues have preoccupied scholars for many years, a point ob scured by Sunstein and Vermeule's selective canvass of the literature on their subject. In a recent article that they do not cite, coauthored by a law professor and a political scientist, we read: "This Article presents an analysis of the institutional context of judicial decisionmaking and of how that context affects decisions."9 And in another, "comparative institutional analysis can inform how courts exercise their interpreta tive function."10 Indeed, most scholars of judicial interpretation have 7. These are not synonyms. But they are all ways of trying to minimize the discretionary element in judicial interpretation of statutory and constitutional provisions. 8. A judge might be a formalist with regard to contract interpretation or even statutory interpretation, yet a pragmatist with regard to constitutional interpretation. The downside of constitutional formalism. I shall argue later, is greater than that of statutory formalism. But Dworkin and Lessig are actually in a minority in not discussing the institutional dimension of interpretation. For example, students of public choice theory, and political conservatives generally -who are skeptical about the good faith of legislators, fear the excesses of democracy, think of statutes as unprincipled compromises, and do not want to help legislators achieve their ends (these skeptics may doubt that legislation has ends worthy of assistance) -tend to favor strict interpretation. They doubt that statutes have a "spirit" or coherent purposes that might channel loose interpretation. They may also wish to hamstring legislatures, forcing them to make constant amendments 13. And Akhil Amar, whom I will not discuss. They may also be correct with respect to John Manning, but I am not familiar with his work.
to adjust to changing conditions; courts committed to strict construc tion refuse to lend legislatures a helping hand.14 The skeptics make at least one good point: to the extent that a statute is a product of compromise, a court that interprets the statute to make it more effec tive in achieving its central goal may be overriding the legislative compromise. 15 At the opposite end of the spectrum from the skeptics, Hart and Sacks, and Calabresi, urge loose interpretation (carried by Calabresi to the extreme of allowing courts to nullify statutes that have become obsolete) and do so on the basis of an explicit belief in the essential good faith, care, intelligence, and public spiritedness of legislators, who these scholars believe welcome a helping hand from judges.16 They may be quite wrong about legislators, but they can hardly be ac cused of being blind to institutional considerations -those are the very considerations that motivate their theories. 
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Realists about the limited intellectual capacities and knowledge bases of Supreme Court Justices -judge skeptics as distinct from legislator skeptics, although there is much overlap between the two groups -advise hesitancy in invalidating statutory and other official action on the basis of constitutional interpretation. That was Holmes's position, and it is mine. We realists think it presumptuous of the Justices, who after all are merely lawyers (as are their academic kibitzers), to consider themselves competent to take sides on profoundly contested moral and political issues involving sexual and reproductive rights, capital punishment, the role of religion in public life, the structure of the political process, and national security.18 We think they should intervene in such areas only if utterly convinced of the completely unreasonable character of the act or practice that they are asked to prohibit. The realist insight is based precisely on the insti tutional limitations of the courts. Those of us who argue that courts should be extremely cautious about checking presidential initiatives in the current emergency do so in part at least on the basis of our as sessment of the relative competence of courts and executive officials to deal with national security issues. 19 Sunstein and Vermeule agree with the realist critique. They say, for example:
The overall effect of the legislative veto, or of its invalidation, is a major research question for experts in political science. There is little reason to believe that generalist judges, devoting a brief time to the subject and possessed of limited information, can form even a plausible view of the relevant complexities.20 I couldn't agree more21 -but this implies that most of the decisions that I had thought Sunstein, at least, would have thoroughly approved of, such as the reapportionment decisions beginning with Baker v. Carr, were, he now believes, wrongly decided, for those deci sions presented major and unanswered research questions for experts in political science.
The authors complain that the judge-centered character of legal education blinds the rest of the scholarly community to the institu tional framework of judicial interpretation: "Legal education, and the what it is like to be a judge, brings institutional issues to the forefront of consciousness. For the first thing a judge has to decide, in inter preting a statute, is what approach to take to questions of statutory in terpretation. The judge who, like Scalia and Easterbrook -who are judges, not merely judge wannabes -doubts the capacity of judges to exercise discretion intelligently will approach the interpretive question with a predilection for strict rather than loose construction.
In any event, the "blindness" of which the authors complain is largely of their imagining. Here are additional examples. Students of legal development recommend rules over standards as the legal regime for developing nations with weak legal infrastructure.2 3 When law consists of precise rules rather than loose standards, the scope of interpretive discretion is curtailed, and judicial corruption and incom petence are thereby held in check because it is easier to determine whether a judge is applying a rule properly than whether he is apply ing a standard properly. Sunstein and Vermeule do not mention this literature.
Hayek's theory of law, which advocates both judicial and legisla tive passivity,24 is based on a profound skepticism about the institu tional competence of both courts and legislatures relative to that of the market, even in advanced modern societies.25 It is another institu tion-based theory of interpretation that Sunstein and Vermeule do not discuss. It builds on the Continental tradition, capsulized in Weber's term "formal rationality," that deplores judicial discretion. One of its notable moments was von Savigny's proposal that the German states (he was writing long before Germany became a nation in 1871) adopt the law of ancient Rome as the law of Germany -a highly formalistic version of Roman law, moreover.26 I have argued that Savigny's for- malism was right for his time and place, where the urgent need (as in developing societies today) was f o r clear, uniform rules that could be applied mechanistically; and that Holmes's rejection of that formal ism27 was right for his time and place, which were very different from Savigny's. By Holmes's time, "[t]he American legal system ... had the suppleness and enjoyed the public confidence to be able to adapt legal principles to current social needs without undue danger of sacrificing legitimacy or creating debilitating legal uncertainty."28
It is therefore incorrect that the possibility "that interpretive for malism at the operational level would itself be the pragmatically best course of action ... remains, for Posner, an abstract and unappealing one."29 I have argued steadily that the choice between formalism and pragmatism in adjudication depends precisely on institutional factors that vary across nations, legal cultures, issues, and epochs. Though accused of "attempt[ing] to wall off institutional considerations from interpretive theory,"30 I have actually been trying to do the opposite. The suggestion that an uncritical faith in judicial capacities has led me to assign too free-wheeling a role to the courts is again the opposite of my view. I am not as distrustful of judges as Sunstein and Vermeule, but, relative to most judges and law professors, I am a debunker of judicial pretensions.31 When Sunstein and Vermeule remark that dur ing the Hitler era German judges employed free-wheeling statutory interpretation to increase the reach and scope of Nazi race law, they are repeating a point I made years ago.32 It was with reference to today's America, rather than to the Third Reich, that I made the sug gestion with which they take issue, cautiously worded though it was, that it is "not insane" to view American judges as "wise elders" who can be entrusted with a measure of discretionary authority. Sunstein and Vermeule omit the institutional factors that I advanced in support of the suggestion. Judges of the higher American courts are generally picked from the upper tail of the popula tion distribution in terms of age. education. intelligence. disinterest, and sobriety. They are not tops in all these departments but they are well above average. at least in the federal courts because of the elaborate preappointment screening of candidates for federal judge ships. Judges are schooled in a profession that sets a high value on listening to both sides of an issue before making up one's mind, on sifting truth from falsehood, and on exercising a detached judgment. Their decisions are anchored in the facts of concrete disputes between factors, but as with Hart and Sacks, so with me, the fact of disagree ment on a specific weighting of institutional factors does not justify an accusation of "institutional blindness."
When they say that "judicial discretion always has system-level effects that judges should consider;"34 they are again making my point yet casting it as a criticism of me. And likewise when they say that "formalism as a decisionmaking strategy in statutory interpretation, or for that matter in any other setting, can be justified or opposed (solely) on the basis of a forward-looking assessment of the conse quences of the competing alternatives."35 Amen. "The debate over in terpretive formalism turns, most critically, on the structure of the lawmaking system rather than on claims about the nature of commu nication, democracy, or jurisprudential principles."36 Precisely -as I have insisted.
The European judiciary is more formalistic than the American. I have ascribed this to the difference between the bureaucratic structure of European court systems and· the lateral-entry character of American court systems (we have no judicial career as such), to the difference between parliamentary and presidential government, and to other institutional and cultural differences.37 Because of these differ ences, the legislative (including constitutional) product that American judges are asked to interpret is too unruly -chaotic even -to be treated as a series of rules from which the correct outcomes in particular cases can be deduced. Formalism is thus not an available strategy for American judges.
Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the causality may be the reverse38 -that the "supposed irresponsibility"39 or "sloppiness"40 of American legislatures may be the product of overly helpful judges real people. Members of the legal _profession have played_ a central role in the political his tory of the United States, and the profession's institutions and usages are reflectors of the fundamental political values that have emerged from that history. Appellate judges in nonroutine cases arc expected to express as best they can the reasons for their decisions in signed. public documents (the published decisions of these courts) and this practice creates accountability and fosters a certain reflectiveness and self-discipline. who by cleaning up after legislators fail to housebreak them; the judges should instead be rubbing the legislature's collective nose in the offal that it produces. They do not mean this literally; they qualify their reverse-causation claim with "in part"41 and "partly."42 Loose construction cannot be the cause of our tricameral legislative system ( tricameral because the veto power makes the President in effect a third house of Congress), our 200-year-old Constitution whose authors were sages but not seers, our federal system that overlays federal law on the legal systems of fifty different states, our weak, undisciplined political parties, our system of appointing or electing judges from other branches of the legal profession, including the academic branch, rather than making judging a career, and the division of governmental powers between the legislative and executive branches. In a parlia mentary system the executive is selected by and answerable ·to the legislature, which usually is effectively unicameral. The result is a very great centralization of government power, which the United States lacks and which makes strict construction a quixotic judicial strategy. It is not because of loose statutory and constitutional construction by judges that the United States has a presidential rather than a parlia mentary system of government.
What Sunstein and Vermeule mean is not that our constitutional architecture itself is a product of loose construction, but that our leg islatures are more unruly than they have to be because our courts in sist on exercising discretion, rather than being content merely to apply statutes as they are written, come what may. This is possible, but as implausible as their criticism of Blackstone's "radical institutional blindness" with regard to the famous law of Bologna that provided "that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity."4 3 Blackstone suggested that the law should not be in terpreted to make punishable a surgeon "who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit." If this is radical institu tional blindness, we need more blind judges. Even strict construction ists would side with Blackstone, invoking the canon of lenity in the in terpretation of criminal statutes,44 or the principle that literal interpretations should be rejected when they produce absurd results -a principle that Sunstein 44. Later in the article the authors express sympathy with that canon. see id. at 918 n.113, but they do not tie it back to the Bologna law.
[c]ourt will ... openly ignore linguistic arguments only extremely rarely and when this would obviously lead to undesirable results. This is the case when such arguments would lead to an obviously absurd meaning or when the statute contains incompatible sentences. One famous example of such an interpretation is that of a statute containing an error in word ing: it forbade passengers of trains to get on or off when it was not moving. 4 5 I am very curious to know what Sunstein and VermeuJe wouJd do with such a case.
Mention of the absurd-results exception to strict construction, taken together with my earlier suggestion that strict construction can hamstring legislatures, brings to the surface an unexamined assump tion of Sunstein and Vermeule's article. It is that legislatures are strengthened when judges are strict constructionists, because then there is no danger that the judges will interpose their own policy views in the guise of (loose) interpretation. The other side of this coin, however, is that neither will the judges intervene to save legislation from being made obsolete by unforeseen changes of circumstance that cause strict construction to produce absurd results. The legislature can step in and eliminate those results by amendment. But at what cost? The legislative process is inertial, and the legislative agenda crowded; amendment is difficult and time-consuming -it has to be, or legisla tion would lack durability.46 And if amendment is feasible, it can be used to cure pathologies of loose as well as strict construction.
Even if the legislature were able to address the absurdities wrought by statutory obsolescence, what is certain is that the correction of ab surd results by constitutional amendment is difficult. In the constitu tional context, strict construction could produce results that Sunstein, at least, would consider absurd, or at least extremely disturbing. For example, a plausible literalist interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is that it forbids affirmative action, of the Sixth Amendment that it requires jury trials in courts-martial, of the First Amendment that it abolishes the tort of defamation, forbids legal protection of trade secrets, and forbids censorship of military secrets, of the Second Amendment that it entitles Americans to carry any weapon that a single individual can heft, including bazookas and surface to air missile launchers, and of article I, section 8 of the Constitution, that Congress cannot establish the Air Force as a separate branch of the armed forces or regulate military aviation at all. If this is where strict con struction with no exception for absurdities leads (does it? I hope they will tell us), we shall have complete legislative paralysis, and a menu of proposed constitutional amendments so long that the amending process will break down also.
The "outrage" test for unconstitutionality that Holmes embraced and Sunstein and Vermeule deplore is an example of loose construc tion that grants a good deal of discretion to judges and by doing so would allow more scope to Congress and state legislatures than the kind of literalism that attracted Justice Black, for example. Restricting judicial discretion is more likely to curtail than, as Sunstein and Vermeule assume, expand legislative discretion because judges are sufficiently responsive to public opinion to avoid (though with notable exceptions) interpretations that have awful consequences for society. Formalism, blind to public opinion, has a robotic momentum that can wreak real havoc; the French case, where strict construction would have forbidden passengers to get on or off a train unless the train was moving, is the perfect symbol of formalism in action.
Pragmatic judges, I have argued elsewhere, balance two types of consequence, the case-specific and the systemic.47 The term "systemic consequence" refers to a consequence for the adjudicative system it self, for example the undermining of legal predictability if judges fail to enforce contracts more or less as written, that is, fail to interpret contractual language strictly. Another term for systemic consequence is institutional factor. Sunstein and Vermeule argue that to advise judges to balance case-specific against systemic consequences is to as sume uncritically that it is proper for judges to exercise discretion, since the balancing in question requires a judgmental rather than algo rithmic determination by the judges. But I had explained why I believe that the institutional structure of American law (the unruly legisla tures, and so forth) prevents American judges from being formalists. If they are to be pragmatists, they will have to balance case-specific against systemic consequences. My recommendation was meant for pragmatic judges, not for all judges. 48 Another institutional consideration bearing on judicial interpreta tion is whether a court has a specialized or a general jurisdiction. There is a literature on this too,49 which Sunstein and Vermeule (while 47. See POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, supra note 19, at 57-96. I had made the point earlier in the article they cite, but in a more abbreviated form. glancing at the issue50) do not mention. Specialized judges can be ex pected to be loose constructionists. Having a stronger sense than gen eralists of how the issues in cases within their jurisdiction should be decided, they are more likely to see themselves as helping the legisla ture achieve the goals of a program than as being obliged to stop with the legislative text; this is a notable characteristic of the patent jurisprudence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 51 Sunstein and Vermeule so reason in arguing that administrative agencies, because they are specialized, should be permitted to engage in loose construction of the statutes they administer.52 They overlook the fact that even generalist courts are specialized to a degree, sometimes a considerable degree. All experienced trial judges, for example, and all appellate judges (a substantial fraction) who were promoted from the ranks of the trial judges, are specialists in the law of evidence. Should they therefore be accorded the privilege of loose construction when interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence?53 The federal courts these days have such a heavy concentration of criminal cases that federal judges can fairly be described as specialists in crimi nal law. Individual judges are specialists in a variety of other fields; think only of Justice Breyer (the federal sentencing guidelines, of which he was a principal author), Judge Easterbrook (securities Jaw), and Judge Leval (intellectual property). Should they be accorded the privilege of loose construction of the fields of which they have spe cialized knowledge? In other words, is "competence," that ambiguous word in law, to construe statutes loosely to be bestowed on institutions on the basis of a formal, categorical, and often fictitious judgment of relative competence (all specialized agencies and specialized courts, but no generalist courts or judges of generalist courts)? Or should spe cialists wherever found claim a broader interpretive latitude, and should so-called "specialists" who don't live up to the name (think only of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which repeatedly in the cases that come before us displays its ignorance of foreign countries) forfeit the deference of reviewing courts? These are impor tant questions of the relation between institutional capacity and inter- 53. Unlike the other federal procedural rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence were actually enacted by Congress; they are statutes.
pretive discretion that Sunstein and Vermeule do not discuss. To remark without elaboration the "superior degree of technical compe tence" of agencies54 is on a par with Hart and Sacks's unsubstantiated claim that legislators must be assumed to be competent and well meaning.
Ill.
Even if previous legal scholars deserve the scolding that Sunstein and Vermeule administer, their article can be faulted for its poverty of feasible suggestions for moving the study of the institu tional framework of judicial interpretation forward. It is no good spanking a child if you cannot show him how to emend his behavior. They say that "a great deal might be done to build on [William] Eskridge's findings" (concerning congressional rejection of judicial in terpretations of statutes).55 No doubt; but it is one thing to issue a clarion call for more research, and another to propose a feasible research program. They do propose some empirical studies, but with out addressing the serious problems of feasibility that the proposals pose. (Maybe they will address them in their response.) They want, for example, a test of the hypothesis that Congress is more willing to "oversee judicial decisions in the areas of tax and bankruptcy" than decisions interpreting the Administrative Procedure Act and the Sherman Act and that "[i]f so, different judicial approaches might be sensible in the different areas."56 They mean that loose construction would be more sensible in the latter two areas. Maybe, but one would have to know why Congress is more active in tax and bankruptcy, and the likeliest answer has nothing to do with strict versus loose construc tion, but rather with the heavy concentration of interest groups in these areas of law.
They suggest testing the hypothesis that states that reject the absurd-results exception to strict construction -states to the right, as it were, of Scalia -will have more legislative activity. have the exception may not enforce it consistently or sensibly. What is needed therefore is some index of absurdity in statutory interpreta tion. A more feasible study would involve correlating state legislative activity with salary, tenure, and other characteristics of a state's judiciary (such as how experienced the judges are and how heavy their caseload is), to see whether the more competent a state's judiciary is likely to be, the more willing the state's legislature is to allow the judges to do the work of keeping statutes sensible and up to date.
The proposal for a study to determine whether a formalist or nonformalist judiciary "will produce mistakes and injustices"57 is a nonstarter unless there is some objective method of determining which decisions are mistaken or unjust; and while it might be possible to study whether "a nonformalist judiciary will greatly increase the costs of decision,"58 it is unclear how the necessary data would be obtained. Sunstein and Vermeule predict that such a study would find that "courts will perceive themselves as most constrained when planning is necessary,"59 yet in the previous sentence they had cited with approval a study finding the opposite: "that formalism might increase planning costs by encouraging strategic behavior."60 Indeed it might, since for malism implies that judges will not use interpretive discretion to close loopholes. 61 Sunstein Although they are critical -maybe, as I am about to suggest, excessively so -of casual empiricism, they engage in it themselves as when they off er a single instance of a legislative response to an absurd decision as evidence for the proposition that strict construction of statutes producing absurd results causes legislatures to update their statutes;66 or when they say in reference to the snail-darter decision67 (the single instance I just referred to -they are working with a small body of data) that "judicial unreliability, on conflicts between environmental and economic goals, might well be taken to argue in favor of formalism."68 They do not explain why in this instance judicial unreliability is greater than legislative unreliability. Elsewhere they say that "[i}t is reasonable to think that by virtue of their specialized competence and relative accountability, agencies are in a better posi tion to make these decisions [resolving statutory ambiguities] than courts."69 No mention is made of the other institutional features of agencies, such as politicization, rapid turnover in membership, deformities resulting from specialization, and lack of actual technical competence, that would have to be weighed in the balance in order to enable a sound comparison between agencies and courts as statutory interpreters. These possibilities are acknowledged later in the article but are not integrated with the earlier suggestion and with the continued insistence -notably in the article's conclusion -that agencies should have a longer leash than courts in interpreting stat utes. Maybe when the deficiencies of administrative agencies -of which Sunstein has written at length70 -are taken into account, it is not reasonable to think agencies better interpreters than courts.
In defending Chevron,71 they fail to note that, insofar as judges are competent and more or less faithful interpreters of statutes (which they may or may not be), the effect of the decision was to displace legislative by administrative discretion,72 contrary to their suggestion that the decision promotes democratic accountability.7 3 In short, they have a soft spot for agencies, and no empirical evidence to back it up. And while they do not explicitly endorse formalism as the dominant strategy for American judges, they Jean strongly in that direction,74 creating tension with Sunstein's rejection of formalism and endorse ment of activist Supreme Court decisions in his other writings. 75 Though having formerly joined the chorus castigating Justice Scalia as excessively formalistic, 76 Sunstein now joins Vermeule in criticizing Scalia for having accepted Blackstone's proposition that literal inter pretations of statutes may be rejected when they would produce ab surd results.77 In other words, Scalia's vice is insufficient rather than excessive formalism.
Here is Sunstein on the absurdity exception to interpretive literalism:
A legislature's failure to anticipate an absurd application of a statutory term, and to make a correction before the fact, is usually not a result of sloppiness or negligence ....
The courts' institutional position, allowing judges to see particular appli cations that legislatures cannot anticipate in advance, puts them in an es pecially good place to correct absurd applications. 78 Blackstone and Scalia couldn't have put it better. In a footnote Sunstein acknowledges a change of heart since an article he wrote in 1989; but the present article is in tension with considerably later work of his. In an article published in 1999 he stated that "while formalism IV.
Casual empmc1sm is often unavoidable in law. Sunstein and Vermeule deny this. They say the fact that "relevant empirical and in stitutional variables are costly to measure" (they are speaking of the variables relevant to the choice between loose and strict construction) is "hardly an argument for nonempirical interpretive theory."81 It is, in fact, a compelling argument. Unavailability of empirical data does not excuse the judge from having to interpret statutes in the cases that come before him f o r decision; and to decide how to interpret them he will perforce have to decide whether he is a loose or a strict construc tionist. He may not be articulate about the choice, but he will make it nonetheless. Sunstein was employing casual empiricism when he embraced the "absurdity" exception to literal interpretation,82 as was Vermeule when he urged the American judiciary to embrace formal ism.8 3 In a recent article, Vermuele acknowledges the inevitability of casual empiricism in regard to choice of interpretive approaches, saying,
There are undoubtedly factual questions that are both relevant to the choice between interpretive formalism and antiformalism and also an swerable by the usual methods of empiricism. But judges must choose doctrines now, and empiricism probably cannot close out enough of the relevant questions quickly and cheaply enough to provide much aid in the short and medium term. 84 His pessimism is supported by his and Sunstein's inability to propose feasible empirical studies of the issue.
Yet there are a number of empirical studies of legal institutions ex tant, including courts, juries, administrative agencies, and legislatures. And some of these, unlike Komesar's and Waldron's, are even quanti tative. 85 What is lacking are rigorous empirical studies of the relative quality of the output of courts, legislatures, and administrative agen cies that would enable a confident choice to be made among different standards of judicial review and different modes of judicial interpreta tion. Specifying, let alone measuring, the "quality" of legal outputs presents a daunting challenge yet to be met.
v.
I want to end on a constructive rather than critical note, putting to Sunstein and Vermeule some questions that may help focus further consideration of the institutional dimension of legal interpretation:
1. Why are American judges not, on the whole, formalists?
2.
May the answer be connected to the nature -or rather absence -of the judicial career in the United States, namely the fact that our judges come to the bench after a career in another branch of the legal profession and generally do not expect further promo tion (e.g., few district judges are promoted to circuit judge and few circuit judge to Supreme Court Justice)?86 If so, and if there fore our judges, not being subjected to the tight control over judi cial discretion that a career judiciary involves, are bound to throw their weight around more, may there not be offsetting advan tages? Or do Sunstein and Vermeule believe that the American judiciary should be restructured, radically or otherwise? 3.
Could the type of persons who become judges in a Continental type career-judiciary system be entrusted with common law re sponsibilities, that is, with actually making law, or is their experi ence too narrow? If they could not be entrusted with lawmaking, does not the American commitment to common law preclude a radical restructuring of the judiciary in the Continental direction? Or has the time come to codify common law? 4.
If they do not favor reorganizing the American judiciary, do they think that articles such as theirs, or the empirical studies that they envisage, are (depending on the outcome of the studies) likely to persuade American judges on their own initiative to become more formalistic? 5.
Do they want to influence judicial behavior, or is their interest in the subject matter of their article purely academic?
86. In most countries, the judiciary is a career that one enters upon graduation from law school (or shortly afterwards), starting at the bottom, for example in traffic court, and working one's way gradually up to a higher level. In England judges are appointed from practice, but, until recently, only from the ranks of the barristers (i.e., trial and appellate lawyers); for a variety of reasons, the English judiciary is actually closer to the Continental (with its career judges) than to the American. For a longer discussion of these issues, see POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 37 (looking at comparative systems); supra note 85 (an analysis of American judges).
